While researching management cards for Japanese aircraft, I stumbled across an interesting article:
HistoryNet.com - Japan's Fatally Flawed Air Forces in World War II
Can anyone enlighten me as to what Japan produced during WWII for air transport? I can't recall any large cargo planes of Japanese origin used in WWII. What is now referred to as 'Air Mobility', either battlefield or strategic, that capability would have been invaluable for an island-hopping war. Especially, if the Army was not working well with the Navy.
I was an Air Force Maintainer for 30 years, and this article reads so true. In the Canadian Air Force, unfortunately, the doctrine bible from which we are taught only contains a single chapter on all things not about flying a plane. The above article highlights all the flaws in that approach, and validates a lot of the issue I used to run into because pilots were in charge of the Air Force. Many of them don't want to get bogged down in logistics, and every time a mission went bad, it was usually because the pilots went into an operation with no though of how to support it. The Japanese Air Forces suffered even worse, according to this article, because they didn't have the experience of a remote war, and the proper method of projecting air power. The Canadian doctrine manual does cover some of this, but not nearly in enough depth.
From what I have read about the German Luftwaffe, they too, did not plan on a long war of attrition. They did not have a robust training and 'aviation crew replacement' program in place when they started their aggressions, nor did they have a robust plan to replace aircraft losses. They suffered from both these things throughout the war. One article I remember reading put forth the idea that Germany lost WWII in the Battle of France, when they lost many more Ju.52 transport planes than expected, and never recovered the logistical Air Mobility loss that impossed on them for the rest of the war. Stalingrad was an example where that loss was most evident. From the start, Goering's assurance to Hitler that the Luftwaffe could maintain an aerial supply chain for the trapped units was completely in error. There wasn't enough air transport in the Luftwaffe, let alone the Eastern Front, to provide sufficient supplies to the trapped units before they started loosing planes in that attempt.
So, another piece of the puzzle in the battles of WWII, highlighting the fact that air forces are expensive, in more than just pilots and planes.
PS: I stand corrected. As of 2017, actually earlier as the publication superseded a 2011 publication on Force Sustainment, the Canadian Forces actually has an entire publication on how to maintain air forces in the field! Someone is learning...
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