Originally Posted by
Dom S
I have to agree with Karl - the decision to switch to bombing cities effectively killed any chance of a German victory in the B of B, but it wasn't that big a chance anyway. The way the two air forces were structured made it look worse than it was, as even at its nadir, the RAF still had depth and strategic reserves, while the Luftwaffe was far more "everything's in the shop window" - the British, oddly, were the ones better geared for sustaining a protracted campaign.
"Fighter command" looked in trouble at times, but was actually comprised of 5 groups, only two of which were extensively engaged, and only one of which was under sustained Luftwaffe attack. That group (Park's 11 Group) was the RAF's strongest, and was certainly in a very bad way at times, but it was by no means fighter command's last line of defence.
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