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csadn
01-01-2012, 14:21
Does anyone know of a decent source to show if/when the Luftwaffe's KzbV1, hauling 7th Flieger Division, lost acft. over Holland during the '40 invasion? I have an angle of _The Battle of France: Then and Now_, but acquiring a copy in the US is... difficult; and I don't want to have to create a login on Axis History just to ask one question.

Why am I asking?

For those of you convinced I am a Complete Loon (well, OK -- technically, I am... :P ), may I present a person I am arguing with on another forum -- a relatively famous published author (no names, for reasons which will become obvious) who is considering writing an alt-history novel where the Germans invade Britain in 1940.

*JUNE* 1940.

How, one asks? According to this person: German Ju-52 losses in the Low Countries have been "double-counted", so that fewer than 100 were destroyed or damaged instead of the nearly 300 the Germans themselves claim; -52 production figures have been undercounted by half, such that the Germans could easily have produced in a month enough units to replace all losses taken in the LC (see previous); and uncounted hundreds of additional -52s (plus crews) were located in training and not-specifically-military functions (civilian airlines, etc.) which could easily be transferred to the Luftwaffe transport branch. Thus, the Germans could easily have generated more than enough flights to keep supplied a mostly-infantry army in southernmost England, which would then march over the mostly-undefended island and take Britain out of the War, at the same time France is being defeated.

Yeah, I know -- he's one of these people who thinks the Germans, who have never won a war in living memory, are creation's gift to warfare.

Baldrick62
01-02-2012, 01:40
Chris,

Really only a 'secondary source' but in 'The Battle of Britain - Camouflage & Markings 1940' (Scott & Madgwick, The Aviation Workshop Publications Ltd, 2010) they state that '(t)he Luftwaffe's Transportgruppen also suffered heavily. Transporting the German paratroops had cost it 125 Ju52s destroyed and forty-seven damaged, representing 50% of the fleet's strength. Most of the transports were destroyed on the ground, and some whilst trying to land under fire, as German forces had not propoerly secured the airfields and landing zones.' Those figures lie somewhere between the 'nearly 300' and 'fewer than 100', so could be argued either way, but the significant stat is the 50% strength loss, and then there needs to be consideration of the number of combat-experienced (Spain, Poland, Denmark, Norway) crews lost with them who can possibly be replaced quantatively very quickly, but not qualitatively.

You might want to try some of the 'After the Battle' series; I have their book on the Battle of France (not much help here though!) but they also have 'Blitzkrieg in the West' which is available through Amazon and should cover the Low Countries.

BofB

Naharaht
01-03-2012, 10:24
In the book 'Luftwaffe at War 07- Stuka Spearhead' by Peter C. Smith published by Greenhill Books on page 8 it states that "the defeat of the Netherlands, Belgium and France was achieved within a six week period for the loss of only 120 Stukas from all causes, which included thirteen shot down by naval gunfire over Dunkirk."

csadn
01-03-2012, 14:29
In the book 'Luftwaffe at War 07- Stuka Spearhead' by Peter C. Smith published by Greenhill Books on page 8 it states that "the defeat of the Netherlands, Belgium and France was achieved within a six week period for the loss of only 120 Stukas from all causes, which included thirteen shot down by naval gunfire over Dunkirk."

Nice -- but does it say anything about Ju-52s? The Stukas were Ju-87s.

Naharaht
01-04-2012, 08:03
Please accept my apologies for making such a stupid mistake.
However I have a copy of another book 'Luftwaffe at War 20 -The Junkers Ju52' by Morten Jessen also published by Greenhill Books which states on page 28 that no less than 157 JU 52's were damaged or destroyed on the ground and in the air by Dutch and British fighters. There are some photographs but I do not know how to post them without putting them on a website first.

Naharaht
01-04-2012, 08:31
I have set up a public album containing scans of the Ju52 photographs, if you want to look at them.

csadn
01-04-2012, 16:14
Please accept my apologies for making such a stupid mistake.

No apologies needed -- "Everybody makes/ Occasional mistakes", if I may quite Allen Sherman. :)


However I have a copy of another book 'Luftwaffe at War 20 -The Junkers Ju52' by Morten Jessen also published by Greenhill Books which states on page 28 that no less than 157 JU 52's were damaged or destroyed on the ground and in the air by Dutch and British fighters. There are some photographs but I do not know how to post them without putting them on a website first.

Therein lies the problem -- the person I am discussing (oh, hell, who am I kidding -- arguing :) ) with on the topic is convinced KzbV1 took *no losses* of any kind during the Holland airdrops; he bases his contention on a single comment from a German general post-war; what I need is citations (preferably from primary sources) stating they did.

(His argument is: The Germany could have "bounced the Channel" in June '40, placing a predominantly-infantry army on British soil, and keeping it supplied wholly via air; this almost immediately after the Low Countries invasion, and while France is retreating. He believes this is possible because, in his words, "German losses in Holland were all double-counted; they lost maybe 100 acft. total"; "reported German production figures for Ju-52s were half of what they really were"; and "there were uncounted hundreds of transports available in Germany serving as trainers, mail-carriers, etc.")

HansK
03-14-2012, 15:19
Hi Chris,

noticed your 'call' while looking around here.

Here's a link to a website covering the struggle in and over Holland in 1940:

http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=the-airforce-4

It goes into some detail of the Ju-52 losses.

I seem to remember that I found a list giving even the details of the Ju-52's involved. Will try to locate it again.

Hans

HansK
03-14-2012, 15:40
Here's a list covering all the losses in/over Holland in 1940.

Lots of Ju-52's in it:

http://www.defensie.nl/media/verliesregister_1940_tcm46-154750.pdf

Hans

csadn
03-15-2012, 14:27
http://www.defensie.nl/media/verliesregister_1940_tcm46-154750.pdf

Very nice -- but I don't speak Dutch (and two years of high-school German is *not* being terribly helpful); I can pick up some of it from context, but not much. However, it does appear to list KzbV1 losses, so thank you.

The "War Over Holland" site I'd already found -- but thank you anyway. (I especially like the line about the Fokker D.XXI: "The odd looking fighter with its fixed gear and lumpy nose had been able to pick up the glove and kick ass." >:) )

HansK
03-15-2012, 15:01
The first column in the listing is just a number to chronologically number the crashes. Of course this is hard to do when aircraft start to rain down all over the place like the Ju's. The second column give you the crash date, the third the time of the crash (approximately). Next one is the crash site, followed by the aircraft type. Next comes the serial or Werkenummer if available, which is followed by the unit. All the Ju's with a * were damaged for 60% or more and are considered to be scrapped or cannibalized. The ones stating 100% are the ones that miss details about the Werkenummer.

The next column gives the name of the (first) pilot, followed by a B if all the details of the crew are known, or an O if some of those details are missing. G means it was destroyed on the ground by bombardment and/or own forces. ZV denotes that the aircraft was destroyed by its own forces and A that it had to be abandoned and was captured by the Germans.

The leaflet states (well, actually not this one but the previous one, starting in 1939) about the Ju-52's, because they arrived in droves and crashed and burned or crashlanded, that only the 'Totalverluste' were counted. So, not the aircraft that got stuck somewhere and simply couldn't take off anymore. But counting the Ju-52 losses is still a black art since many details still remain unsure or unproven. While compiling this listing they tried to determine the details by checking and double checking as much as possible.

I hope this helps you to decypher the list.

:)

Hans

HansK
03-15-2012, 15:30
Ha, the Germans could never ever have pulled that off in June 1940:

1) they lost quite a few Ju-52's already in Scandinavia;
2) the number of aircraft lost in The Netherlands piles on top of this, not to mention the crews that were KIA/WIA/MIA/POW;
3) they already had to scrape the barrel in order to get enough aircraft and crews ready to invade The Netherlands from the air;
4) what about material like parachutes and such, not to mention man fit enough to jump out of a perfectly functioning aircraft again;
5) they needed to train new pilots for the Ju-52's and perform various duties with them too at the same time.

Conclusion: impossible in June 1940.

csadn
03-16-2012, 15:19
Ha, the Germans could never ever have pulled that off in June 1940:

1) they lost quite a few Ju-52's already in Scandinavia;
2) the number of aircraft lost in The Netherlands piles on top of this, not to mention the crews that were KIA/WIA/MIA/POW;
3) they already had to scrape the barrel in order to get enough aircraft and crews ready to invade The Netherlands from the air;
4) what about material like parachutes and such, not to mention man fit enough to jump out of a perfectly functioning aircraft again;
5) they needed to train new pilots for the Ju-52's and perform various duties with them too at the same time.

Conclusion: impossible in June 1940.

I know -- but the author in question* is one of these people who thinks "Germany is God's gift to warfare" (to which I reply "Umm - *how many* wars have they won as a unified country?" Hint: The answers is between 1, and -1, non-inclusive >:) ). I am attempting to get through to him "the acft. did not exist, nor did the personnel", in order to prevent him making a giant leap from "mildly irritating right-winger" to "full-throttle crypto-Nazi". :)

[*: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Kratman -- I realize I am attempting to argue with an Infantryman, but sometimes it has to be done. :) ]

HansK
03-16-2012, 15:27
Forget about it 'cause you'll probably never win this. Same as the Germans...

;)

csadn
03-17-2012, 13:08
Forget about it 'cause you'll probably never win this. Same as the Germans...
;)

Indeed -- he's German, *and* Infantry.... :)

Baldrick62
03-17-2012, 15:32
I know -- but the author in question* is one of these people who thinks "Germany is God's gift to warfare" (to which I reply "Umm - *how many* wars have they won as a unified country?"

Ok, hair-splitting between cause and effect, but it could be argued that the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, where the success of a Prussian alliance with other German States in defeating Imperial France was the cause of German unification, was brought about by the combined action of those 'German' states.

Jager
03-18-2012, 08:22
While I'm all for "what-ifs" and such, there is no way even the intact air transportation wing of the Luftwaffe could have supplied (let alone delivered) a large enough force to threaten to conquor the British Isles in 1940. Maybe after a couple years of buildup (and no Russian invasion!), they might have gotten somewhere with Sea Lion.
Karl

csadn
03-18-2012, 19:12
Ok, hair-splitting between cause and effect, but it could be argued that the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, where the success of a Prussian alliance with other German States in defeating Imperial France was the cause of German unification, was brought about by the combined action of those 'German' states.

I count that as a "Prussian" national victory, not a "German" one -- the F-P War was all over bar the shouting when the Reich was formed (the war's name says it all).


While I'm all for "what-ifs" and such, there is no way even the intact air transportation wing of the Luftwaffe could have supplied (let alone delivered) a large enough force to threaten to conquor the British Isles in 1940. Maybe after a couple years of buildup (and no Russian invasion!), they might have gotten somewhere with Sea Lion.

Oh, it gets better: The author (no names -- I don't want him finding this during a web-search :) ) thinks the Germans could support a purely (or almost-purely) infantry force on British soil, via the time-honored practice of "living off the land"; that Britain will have no effective defense, as most of its forces will be on the Continent with most of the modern weaponry; that Britain's army officers, being a pack of thundering morons, will be unable to create an effective resistance; and that British civilians will bend over and smile when the Germans invade, because the Germans will be treating them the same way they treated the Easterlings historically ("you snipe one of our soldiers, we torch the nearest village and shoot ten civilians" -- that sort of thing; never mind not even the Germans themselves were willing participants, a fact brought up at the Wannsee Conference, of all places!).

Like I said: I'm trying to prevent him making the pole-vault from "right-wing weirdo" to "full-throttle crypto-Nazi", which will be a Career-Ending Move for him; not even his current publisher will be able to touch him after publishing this.

pbhawkin
03-19-2012, 02:37
:-)

csadn
03-19-2012, 14:10
:-)

You know who- and what-of I speak, then? :)

Baldrick62
04-07-2012, 03:43
As the topic has been broadened from the Low Countries to 1940 in the West, this may be of interest. In 1974 an exercise was held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst using a scenario based on the known plans of each side, plus previously unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940.

'Each side (played by British and German officers respectively) was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School of Infantry.

The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert. The main problems the Germans face are that: a) the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides (for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until late September to assemble the necessary shipping.

22 Sep 40 - Morning. The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield. The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged, whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings, which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were identified. Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200 fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs, but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible into the Pas de Calais.

22 - 23 Sep. The Germans had still not captured a major port, although they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing raids and then further losses at their ports in France. The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the Channel. German shipping losses on the first day amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.

23 Sep - Dawn-1400 hrs. The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and 70 bombers), and the RN had suffered enough losses such that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a German build up in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to the South West. The German Navy were despondant about their losses, especially as the loss of barges was seriously dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Luftwaffe commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides overestimated losses inflicted by 50%. The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind commando group interdicted the runways. The first British counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings. 7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with stickybombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken Newhaven (the only German held port), however, the New Zealand Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on Dover having lost 35% casualties.

23 Sep - 1400-1900 hrs. Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort, with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of this effort was directed for ground support and air resupply, despite Adm Raeder's request for more aircover over the Channel. The RN Home Fleet had pulled out of air range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats, they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing all their DDs and 7 E-Boats. The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many cases these were incomplete and waiting for their second echelon to arrive that night. The weather was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision to sail was referred up the chain of command.

23 Sep - 1900-24 Sep Dawn. The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat rendered the Channel indefensible without air support. Goering countered this by saying it could only be done by stopping the terror bombing of London, which in turn Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by. The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for inflated figures. On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave, but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By the time the order reached the ports, the second wave could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not be reinforced at all.

24 Sep - Dawn-28 Sep. The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats, E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone, but the port had been so badly damaged that they could only unload two at a time. The failure on the crossing meant that the German situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead. Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as further British attacks hemmed them in tighter. Fast steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed on 22nd September, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest were killed or captured.'

csadn
04-07-2012, 17:28
As the topic has been broadened from the Low Countries to 1940 in the West, this may be of interest. In 1974 an exercise was held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst using a scenario based on the known plans of each side, plus previously unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940.

Just for reference: Where did you find this?

Also: The author in question is postulating an invasion in May-June -- basically, when the Germans split the British and French, they "bounce the Channel" and invade Britain directly -- so I'm wondering what the "starting forces" would look like in that event. That's a big part of why I was looking for loss data on KzbV1 -- as noted, the author is claiming it took no losses of any kind during the Low Countries invasion, and most of the rest of the losses were "double-counted" or otherwise overstated; such that the Germans would still have not only most of the 475-odd acft. they had historically, but could also do what they did in '39 and strip the training programs and "other users" for extra acft., thus allowing the Germans to fully supply a predominantly-infantry army entirely by air (oh, did I mention that this early in the war, the Germans would be practicing in Britain many of the same civilian-control measures employed in the East in '41 and later?). Yeah, I know -- the smell is horrific, and it's creeping up to the rim of your hip-waders; but this is what comes of the piss-poor design of so many WW2 games over the past fifty years -- people actually believe the Germans were a credible threat.

Marechallannes
04-08-2012, 00:52
Seems the real Germans were much more realistic in their invasion plans for England than the fictional Germans of your author.

To transport, land and support an German "UK-Invasion-Army" through the air in the 1940s was impossible. Even with double or tripple transport capacity.

No artillery, tanks, vehikles for operations, etc.

Do you stay in communication with Heinrich von Stahl?

http://transgalaxis.de/pics/artikel/hjb_kaisfro1949_05xm.jpg

Baldrick62
04-08-2012, 11:40
Just for reference: Where did you find this?

Unfortunately I don't have a definitive (archive) reference for the commentary however, if you google 'Sandhurst Sealion' you'll get a lot of hits and may be able to weed out the original.

As I've now induced a lot of thread-creep from the original question, I've reposted here for those who want to keep going with SEALION rather than Ju52 losses in the Low Countries.
http://www.wingsofwar.org/forums/showthread.php?9582-Operation-Sealion-Kriegspiel&p=137170#post137170

Regarding 'bouncing the Channel' in May-Jun '40, I think your friend has just provided ample justification for Dowding's decision not to commit Spitfires to the BEF. An air assault and resupply without any decent fighter cover (due range) let alone any modicum of air superiority for the Germans as they haven't written down the Spitfire squadrons, blinded the Chain Home network or disrupted Fighter Command's C2 system. Sounds like 'Operation CERTAIN DEATH' to me!

csadn
04-08-2012, 19:27
Do you stay in communication with Heinrich von Stahl?

I am wholly unfamiliar with the name -- tho' the fact that book cover has one of the notional "1,000-ton tanks" on it....


Unfortunately I don't have a definitive (archive) reference for the commentary however, if you google 'Sandhurst Sealion' you'll get a lot of hits and may be able to weed out the original.

Right -- I'll look for it.


Regarding 'bouncing the Channel' in May-Jun '40, I think your friend has just provided ample justification for Dowding's decision not to commit Spitfires to the BEF. An air assault and resupply without any decent fighter cover (due range) let alone any modicum of air superiority for the Germans as they haven't written down the Spitfire squadrons, blinded the Chain Home network or disrupted Fighter Command's C2 system. Sounds like 'Operation CERTAIN DEATH' to me!

Exactly what I keep trying to tell him -- yet he's convinced the British will be too scattered, and the Isles too undefended, to resist an infantry force; that if the Germans do not waste effort bringing anything except Warm Bodies and Live Ammo, and live off the British land, they can accomplish resupply feats equal to Norway, or Demyansk, and win the campaign; that the RAF's failure during the "Channel Dash" shows that ships in the Channel are almost invulnerable to air power, so the invasion barges and ships will be in marginal danger; and a whole bunch of other details.

(One large problem in dealing with this author: He's former Army Infantry, and a retired lawyer -- so he's reasonably capable of making an argument; and too stubborn to change his mind one it's made up. :) )

Baldrick62
04-09-2012, 06:11
(One large problem in dealing with this author: He's former Army Infantry, and a retired lawyer -- so he's reasonably capable of making an argument; and too stubborn to change his mind one it's made up. :) )


As B. H. Liddell Hart said, "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is getting an old one out."

csadn
04-09-2012, 12:33
As B. H. Liddell Hart said, "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is getting an old one out."

True -- I use the phrase "Hidebound traditionalism" around him a lot; an example of which would be the infamous quote from the British admiral on seeing Britain's first submarine: "They didn't have those when *I* was a midshipman, so we shouldn't have them now!"