ABDA: An Unsuccessful Band of Brothers

[Baldrick62]

An interesting read on an often-ignored part of the early Pacific War, which emphasises the utility of airpower in the NEI campaign and the way the Japanese used it as a direct element of their operational planning, while ABDA took a maritime focus with airpower as a tactical consideration at best (and in any case, lacked the resources to be effective). It also provides good commentary on the competing national political agendas and personal goals of ABDA commanders.

'Airpower proved to be the decisive factor that led to ABDA’s defeat. The establishment of air superiority in the region gave the Japanese freedom of maneuver against allied forces. Airpower also meant that the ABDA forces lost their ability to maneuver and had to adjust their strategy continually to more defensive operations. The lack of defenses for Allied airbases in the NEI made them vulnerable to attack and seizure. Each area lost to ABDA meant more areas for Japanese airfields to attrite ABDA forces.'

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416342

AMERICAN, BRITISH, DUTCH, AUSTRALIAN COALITION: UNSUCCESSFUL
BAND OF BROTHERS, by Steven B. Shepard, 71 pages.

Abstract:
This thesis examines the American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) coalition from its beginning to its end. Following initial Japanese advances and victories in December 1941 and January 1942, Allied forces formed the ABDA coalition as one of the first methods to respond to the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) area. ABDA’s existence was painful and short-lived, culminating in its demise as Japanese forces gained area military air and naval superiority and invaded Java in March 1942. Differing objectives and priorities by allied components influenced the ability of ABDA to fight effectively. Additional factors were poor Command and Control (C2) of tactical forces composed of different nations. Four major naval surface engagements and multiple land and air engagements did not stop the NEI from falling in March 1942. ABDA’s political, military, and tactical dynamics merit further study for implications for future multinational operations in which the United States may be involved. The purpose of the research will be to answer the following three questions: Why did ABDA not work, what could have made ABDA succeed, and what implications can be learned for modern military forces fighting in the coalition arena.

[Jager]

Looks to be an interesting read.
Thanks Baldrick.
Karl

[csadn]

Pretty-much a total WOMBAT project to start with; then handed over to cross-eyed nitwits like Dugout Doug and Wavell.

And "coalition warfare" -- oh dear god; when are these people going to get through their thick skulls?: In any relationship, there is a Top, and a Bottom; and if you have to ask who's the Top, it *ain't* you.

[wargamer]

Without trying to go political. dugout doug only had drama going for him.

wavell? it is possible, just barely, that he might have had a clue.

[Baldrick62]

wavell? it is possible, just barely, that he might have had a clue.

Certainly an interesting, and difficult to categorise, commander. Could it be that Wavell simply lacked what Napoleon said was critical for success: luck?

'So was Wavell a good general, or a bad one?

'He was certainly better than many who got more credit for doing far easier jobs later. He had better understanding of strategy than Dill or Marshall (but not better than Brooke or MacArthur); better grasp of theater command than Eisenhower or Alexander (but not Nimitz or Brooke), and better leadership of troops than Bradley or Anderson (but not Montgomery or Truscott). So in practical terms he was one of the best all round generals of the war, which means he may well have shone in the roles that Dill or Marshall or Eisenhower or Alexander or Bradley or Anderson received undeserved credit for.

'His faults largely came down to being too deferential to his political superiors, and to being misused by them. Which in the end means that his superiors were at fault for asking the impossible too many times, and never giving him a break with adequate guidance or support.'

http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/rating-general-wavell.html

[Baldrick62]

Pretty-much a total WOMBAT project to start with...

Ok, I'll bite: got the rest, but what's the M stand for? Everything I come up with is made redundant by the blood and treasure.

[Jager]

Certainly an interesting, and difficult to categorise, commander. Could it be that Wavell simply lacked what Napoleon said was critical for success: luck?

'So was Wavell a good general, or a bad one?

'He was certainly better than many who got more credit for doing far easier jobs later. He had better understanding of strategy than Dill or Marshall (but not better than Brooke or MacArthur); better grasp of theater command than Eisenhower or Alexander (but not Nimitz or Brooke), and better leadership of troops than Bradley or Anderson (but not Montgomery or Truscott). So in practical terms he was one of the best all round generals of the war, which means he may well have shone in the roles that Dill or Marshall or Eisenhower or Alexander or Bradley or Anderson received undeserved credit for.

'His faults largely came down to being too deferential to his political superiors, and to being misused by them. Which in the end means that his superiors were at fault for asking the impossible too many times, and never giving him a break with adequate guidance or support.'

http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/rating-general-wavell.html

Pretty much agree with you on Wavell; I think he was a better General than given credit for in the histories; possibly not lucky enough, but certainly abused by the Pols above.
MacArthur may have been a greater general than I think he was, but he certainly thought himself far better than he was; and the subordinates can take the blame for him.
Karl

[Jager]

Pretty-much a total WOMBAT project to start with;

Ok, I'll bite: got the rest, but what's the M stand for? Everything I come up with is made redundant by the blood and treasure.

I'll have to plea a total loss on this. HUH?
Karl

[Zakopious]

Several meanings for WOMBAT can be found on the internet.
However, "Waste Of Money, Brains And Time" seems most likely.
See:
http://slangmeans.com/wombat-meaning

[gully_raker]

Several meanings for WOMBAT can be found on the internet.
However, "Waste Of Money, Brains And Time" seems most likely.
See:
http://slangmeans.com/wombat-meaning

Down here in Oz we have a mammal called a Wombat who eats roots & leaves!:lol::lol::lol:

[csadn]

Several meanings for WOMBAT can be found on the internet.
However, "Waste Of Money, Brains And Time" seems most likely.
See:
http://slangmeans.com/wombat-meaning

This one. :)

I don't know about Wavell being unlucky -- I do know that failure tended to appear about the same time he did (I won't blame him for what happened in Greece -- that was stupidity at *far* higher levels). Best I can figure is: He wasn't equipped for fighting "war on a shoestring", which is what he kept being asked to do; and he lacked the "dash" of an O'Connor or a Patton required to operate in campaigns where rigid front lines were rare-to-nonexistant.

[Marechallannes]

Can someone tell me the name of an Allied or Soviet Commander that hold the line versus the Axis in the early war years* or prevent the Axis from reaching their first goals and planed progresses? :confused:

*before Stalingrad, Midway or El Alamein

The fall of Singapore came into my mind.

I'm not shure, if supposed better commanders would have performed better in this situation.

[Nightbomber]

Of course I can, dear Wingman :):

1. Major Henryk Sucharski, The defense of Westerplatte, September 1939.

2. Kapitan Władysław Raginis, The battle of Wizna, September 1939.
(check: Sabaton's song: 40:1)

[Supercap]

colonel Julian Filipowicz and his cavalry brigade, battle of Mokra, September 1939
captian Tomasz Semik, battle of Węgierska Górka, September 1939

[Marechallannes]

Of course they did - brave islands of resistance - but they prohibit not the entire Invasion of Poland.

I think this thread is about entire operations (Feldzüge) and high commanders like the ABDA actions and General Wavell in the South & South-West Pacific area.

Sorry for not clarify this, my Polish friends. ;)

[Baldrick62]

I think this thread is about entire operations (Feldzüge) and high commanders like the ABDA actions and General Wavell in the South & South-West Pacific area.

Not too many operational level defeats spring to mind, as the Axis were on a bit of a roll until late '42!

Gen Richard O'Connor - Op Compass 1940 (Italian defeat)
Lt Gen Alan Cunningham - East African Campaign 1940-41 (Italian defeat)
Gen Edward Quinan - Anglo-Iraq War 1941 (Iraqi defeat)
Gen Sir Maitland Wilson - Syria-Lebanon Campaign 1941 (Vichy French defeat)
All serving under Wavell's overall command

Lt Gen Sydney Rowell - Kokoda 1942 (Japanese defeat)
Lt Gen Cyril Clowes - Milne Bay 1942 (Japanese defeat)
Ok, both after Midway, but land actions to seize and/or hold ground rather than a temporal maritime action. But if you want to go navy:
RAdm Frank Fletcher USN - Coral Sea 1942 (Japanese defeat)

And, just for good measure:
ACM Hugh Dowding - Battle of Britain 1940 (German defeat)

[csadn]

Gen Richard O'Connor - Op Compass 1940 (Italian defeat)

I often wonder what might have been accomplished in the Desert had he not been taken prisoner in early '41, and been out of action until D-Day.