The "Morotai Mutiny"

[csadn]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morotai_Mutiny

Of note here is the reaction of Gen. George Kenney, who didn't precisely have a dog in this race, but who did see the "mutineers" had a point, and supported them.

[wargamer]

Yes, one of the few air corps commanders who wasn't locked into the suicidal daylight precision bombing nonsense.

[FrankJamison]

If you haven't read it already, "General Kenney Reports" is one of the great stories of the war in the Pacific.

[Naharaht]

I had not heard about this incident before.

[csadn]

George Kenney is one of my favorite generals, precisely because he was a staff officer who thought outside-the-box, and let subordinates with "interesting" ideas have a chance to test their ideas (Maj. "Pappy" Gunn, in particular). It surprises me not in the slightest that Kenney would look at the situation, and choose the side he chose.

[Baldrick62]

Unfortunately, Kenney's support didn't help rehabilitate Harry Cobby, or get rid of Jones.

[csadn]

Unfortunately, Kenney's support didn't help rehabilitate Harry Cobby, or get rid of Jones.

Cobby is an example of Sun Tzu's dictum: "When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is INSUBORDINATION. When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is COLLAPSE. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is RUIN."

And getting rid of both Bostick and Jones would have been a plus.

(And let's face it: A large part of the problem was that f***ing incompetent a**hole MacArthur.)

[Carl_Brisgamer]

The RAAF had major problems with higher headquarters during the war, the Morotai Mutiny was one result. I wonder how things might have been different if Richard Williams (father of the RAAF) had been given overall command of the service instead of being sent to the UK and USA. Political interference and professional jealousy denied the RAAF the right man for the job.

[gully_raker]

:thumbsup:For anyone interested in the exploits of Clive "Killer" Caldwell I highly recommend the book "Killer Caldwell--Australias greatest Fighter Pilot" by Jeffrey Watson published in 2005 by Hodder in paperback format. It covers Caldwells entire WW2 career & his life after the war. You will get his side of the Moratai situation as Watson interviewed Caldwell & other Aussie Pilots & there a lot of quotes.
Incidently Clive hated the nick name "Killer" which had been coined by the press.

[Baldrick62]

The RAAF had major problems with higher headquarters during the war, the Morotai Mutiny was one result. I wonder how things might have been different if Richard Williams (father of the RAAF) had been given overall command of the service instead of being sent to the UK and USA. Political interference and professional jealousy denied the RAAF the right man for the job.

Peter Ewer's 'Wounded Eagle' http://www.wingsofwar.org/forums/showthread.php?9207-WGS-Wounded-Eagle-The-Bombing-of-Darwin-and-Australia-s-Air-Defence-Scandal gives an interesting and informed take on the political manoeuvring in the pre-war RAAF and the talents of AM Richard Williams.

[csadn]

The RAAF had major problems with higher headquarters during the war, the Morotai Mutiny was one result. I wonder how things might have been different if Richard Williams (father of the RAAF) had been given overall command of the service instead of being sent to the UK and USA. Political interference and professional jealousy denied the RAAF the right man for the job.

With all due respect to the Antipodean contingent here: It wasn't just the RAAF which had problems. There's an instance during the conflict of a morale-building exercise tried by Army command -- the best-presented battalion in the Australian army would receive two weeks' leave.

The winning battalion, upon reaching Australia, deserted en masse.

I can't prove it, but my theory is: Too many people remembered the shabby treatment of the ANZACs in WW1, and WW2 didn't appear to be shaping up to be an improvement.

[Baldrick62]

... the best-presented battalion in the Australian army would receive two weeks' leave. The winning battalion, upon reaching Australia, deserted en masse.

Not to say it isn't true, and assuming it was a 2nd AIF battalion, after more than 2 years away from home fighting through North Africa (and potentially Syria, Greece and Crete), quite understandable (if not condoneable). Do you have any reference for this 'event'?

It's a pretty scurrilous claim, that the 'best' unit in the Australian Army deserted, which draws conclusions as to the worth of the other units, so some historical proof would be much appreciated (before I cry 'hoop' again to another csadn post).

[Lt. S.Kafloc]

I'd love to see your information sources to back up this claim. In what way was the treatment of the ANZAC's any different to the treatment of any other allied soldier in either war? Hindsight is a great thing but unless the sources are first hand written accounts I can't see how it did. I would also like you to quantify shabby treatment, by who?


I can't prove it, but my theory is: Too many people remembered the shabby treatment of the ANZACs in WW1, and WW2 didn't appear to be shaping up to be an improvement.

[Jager]

I would have to dig, but IIRC (from Dunnagan's "Dirty Little Secrets of WW2"), it was a company in New Guinea, and the competition was a camouflage exercise.
As for the perceived treatment of the Commonwealth by the British Home Government, that would take a thesis paper's worth of research, but factors I can recall from readings:
There were leftovers feelings from the First World War, the mishandling of CW troops and particularly the Dardanelles Champaign.
The use of Australian and New Zealand units in North Africa for the Greece expedition, despite the misgivings of their Commanders, and the possibility that the War Cabinet did a slight of hand
by letting Governments and the Generals think the other's had agreed on it.
The fact the despite evidence of a Japanese attack towards Australia being imminent, the Home Government's refusal to return ground and air units to defend their homes.
And though the USA may have seemed a preferred ally, it isn't like we didn't have our faults too. MacArthur comes to mind all to well.
Karl

[Baldrick62]

The fact the despite evidence of a Japanese attack towards Australia being imminent, the Home Government's refusal to return ground and air units to defend their homes.

Thanks for the other bits; Dunnagan isn't a source I'm familiar with. As for the above, what I assume you're referring to is Churchill's unilateral decision to divert 2nd AIF units returning from North Africa into Burma in 1942, as following the fall of Singapore the all-conquering Japanese were sweeping through the NEI and an invasion of Australia seemed imminent (although later research has discounted this apparent threat).

[wargamer]

Re; Jim Dunnigan; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Dunnigan

[Baldrick62]

Thanks, but that tells us who he is, not the content of what he's written or how he researched his 'dirty little secrets'.

[Dal Gavan]

G'day, Gents.

Baldrick, James F Dunnigan is a noted boardgame designer (one of the founders of Simulations Publications Inc) and also a military theorist. I've got a couple of his books here.

Don't forget that as well as trying to divert 7DIV to Rangoon, on Churchill's orders elements of 16 and 17 BDE were left as a garrison in Ceylon from April to end of July 1942- when they were sorely needed in PNG and to train the AMF units being raised. Curtin later agreed to them remaining, but it further strained relations between our pollies and Britain's.

Churchill also had FDR try to persuade Curtin to leave the Australian forces in the MTO/ETO- FDR actually criticised Curtin's demands to have the Australian forces returned, and for sewing discord in the Allied leadership. There's a lot of Australians who lived during WWII that have little time for Churchill, as you probably know. I think that's a bit unfair- as the British PM he was trying to look after Britain's interests by keeping as many soldiers, sailors and airmen as he could- much as Curtin was trying to do by having the Australian forces returned. I have no doubt Curtin would have done the same to any British troops stationed in Australia, given the chance- just look at the size of the Garrison forces in Australia in 1944- when it was obvious there's be no Japanese invasion.

That diplomatic stoush led to our ultimate move away from the UK and reliance on the US as our major ally.

Chris abd Karl, that story of the disappearing battalion is only an urban legend, I'm afraid. Australian units weren't returned to Australia for leave, although individuals were (on rare occasions). There were some problems with AMF (Militia- distinguished from the 2nd AIF by not having "2/" in front of the unit number) that did have particular problems- one battalion was taken out of the line and used as porters, for example (55 BN AMF).

There were mutinies in the army (eg the refusal of an AMF company (BCOY, 53BN?) to move up to their start line for an assault during the final phases of the Buna battles), however these were played down and fairly much buried- few histories refer to them and few people were charged. Individuals or small groups who failed to return from leave were more common. They still are, in fact. ;)

Neil, the idea that Dominion troops were used as cannon fodder during both world wars is fairly common. Good examples are the films Gallipoli and The Light Horsemen- the director of Gallipoli, Peter Weir, deliberately changed history to get his anti-Pom message out, changing the nationality of the commander who ordered the last futile charges at The Nek from Australian to British.

Like most things, there's a nugget of truth under all the dross. Dominion troops were treated poorly by the CIGS. But then again, so were the British troops under their command. In WWII the perception is coloured by the above-mentioned diplomatic row between Oz and Blighty, especially Churchill's insistence that the Germans were the main enemy and that The Empire would come back and expel the Japanese from Australia, once Germany was defeated.

Apologies for rabbittin' on. If anyone's interested, there's a reasonable précis of the Churchill-Curtin affair at http://cliojournal.wikispaces.com/Curtin%2C+Churchill+and+Australian+Foreign+Policy?responseToken=d7a2ae2b04ede0feb41d618e988ddeb1. It's biased- showing Curtin in a better light than he should be shown. His standing up to Churchill should be remembered as completely opposite to his abject surrender to MacArthur's/FDR's demands. And his attempts to win a bigger seat at the peace conference, by wasting Australian lives in futile and unnecessary mopping-up campaigns in the SWPA, get glossed over by most histories.

Cheers.

Dal.

[Carl_Brisgamer]

Well said Dal. Never ceases to amaze me how these 'furphies' keep going around and around over the many decades.

[Baldrick62]

Dal,
Thanks for an excellent, informative and balanced post that exposes the half-truths.
BofB

[Jager]

An interesting article, Dal. It documents what Curtin was saying at a given time, but what was the attitude of the nation?
There may have been a definite difference between what was said between the political leadership, publicly and privately, but it's the perception of the people on the ground that we're speaking of.
And there was a definite expectation of a Japanese invasion at the time. Heck, we were waiting for them to sail into San Francisco harbor right after Pearl harbor. In 1942, Life Magazine published an article on how the Germans and Japanese were going to invade the USA.
And there were a number of times during the war that Churchill didn't seem to care about anything but his view of the war. There were rumors at the time (and still are) that he and Roosevelt conspired
to get the USA into the war.
Whether Curtin kowtowed too much to MacArthur, or was just making the best of a bad situation, the Australian military was badly used by the US in the SW Pacific.
I don't believe MacArthur was a great general, merely a good one with a great ego, and an instinct for PR. He had a competent staff and subordinate leadership, and never
gave any of them any credit. There was really no need to wrinkle out the cutoff units of the Japanese army in New Guinea and Indonesia, but to use an ally to do the dirty deed
to save long casualty lists back home was beyond the pale. As for Australian leadership insisting on (unnecessary) actions to puff themselves up for the post-war divisions, that's one I hadn't heard.

Karl

[Lt. S.Kafloc]

I'm not disagreeing with the fact that our Commonwealth nations suffered greatly in both world wars. Mistakes and bad leadership abound in all armies.
And I remember a certain American director when asked about historical accuracy and replied "If I have to invent history to make a film sell then I will". Or words to that effect. How many Americans believed that the British during the AWI did indeed burn those civilians in the church during the film called The Patriot.
Of course during Gallipoli campaign the ANZAC's lost an incredible amount of men, but so too did the British forces and other Commonwealth nations too.
Hindsight is a great thing. I remember reading Liddleharts History of WW1 and throwing it in the bin. I was sickoned of reading the vast amount of casualties lost for a few yards gained. However I read an article by a British commander during the later months of the war and he quite simply stated that the BEF of 150,000 men could not cope with the rapid expansion to over a million. People who were Post Office managers became Post master Generals. People who bought supplies for big shops became Army QM's with no experience of what is was like in the armed forces. His sector was next to the French sector. His newly arrived corps were ordered to attack to take the pressure of the French, who at that time had mutinied and would only defend not attack. He stated that they knew how to cross no-mans land, like the German assault teams. Small groups pepper potting across NML. But with no time to train the newly arrived troops all they could do was line them up and send them over the top to certain death. That for me was the leveler, there is always the other side of the coin when it comes to what did, may or should have happened.

[David Manley]

Well said Dal. Never ceases to amaze me how these 'furphies' keep going around and around over the many decades.

How true. Aluminium superstructures leading to the loss of Type 42s and Type 21s in the Falklands is one I have to deal with on an almost monthly basis in a professional capacity

[Doug]

Well this may be a bit of a side track from the main thread, but in my personal view Australia did everything they could to help out England, yet when Australia was in perril Churchill did nothing. Where as America provided us with boundless support. All American assistance was greatly appreciated, except for one item McAurther! To reiterate this is a personal view I have grown up with all my life it is my 20/20 hindsite.

[Dal Gavan]

G'day.

Carl, we don't forget those furphies because I think we'd like them to be true. So they get re-told, passed on, changed to suit current circumstances (I can imagine it will morph into a story about a battalion returning from Afghanistan, one day- it started out as a WWI battalion, after all) and lovingly kept until the next occasion to trot it out.

BaldRick, thanks for the kind words. It's an interesting period of our history, but one that's rarely really examined.

Karl,
It documents what Curtin was saying at a given time, but what was the attitude of the nation?

Good question, mate. In a nutshell- the country was scared spitless, Churchill's speech seemed like a betrayal (though perfectly understandable from his strategic viewpoint), and the US forces were greeted as saviours. Things were more complicated than that, of course. Part of the reason that Curtin demonised Churchill's stance so stridently was that Churchill was of the same political philosophies as Menzies, Curtin's opposition leader in Parliament. "Pig-Iron Bob" was a died-in-the-wool Imperialist as well, so there was another wedge to use for political advantage= Menzies would let Churchill do what he would, and let the Japanese take Australia.

Combine the above with the growing sense of nationalism that had begun during the 2nd Boer War and Curtin was able to both reflect and guide the popular emotions of the time.


There was really no need to wrinkle out the cutoff units of the Japanese army in New Guinea and Indonesia, but to use an ally to do the dirty deed
to save long casualty lists back home was beyond the pale.
I'm no fan of MacArthur, but I don't think he's responsible for the Australian operations after late 1943. The cabinet papers released in the '80's showed that the government was afraid that they'd be shunted out of the peace process, as had happened in 1919. Also Blamey, the GOC Australian Army, was trying to keep his influence and repair his reputation, after some ill-considered and damaging sackings of senior commanders in PNG. And it's fact that MacArthur strongly opposed the Borneo landings, seeing them as an unnecessary diversion of resources from the build up to Operation Downfall. There was also the political wrangling over who was going to invade Japan- the US wanted to do the initial landings and only bring in token Allied forces after the invasion proper had gained firm ground. Churchill and Curtin were afraid that, and the lack of any real gains by British or Australian forces in the drive towards Japan, would mean that Japan became a US protectorate, severely reducing British (and Australian) influence in the Far East- as indeed happened.

Bougainville, New Britain, Northern PNG and Borneo were all unnecessary by mid-1944, the garrisons isolated and spending more time trying to grow food than fighting. So once again pollies sent young men to die, so that they might gain the recognition they felt was their due. Menzies supported these operations as well, so Parliament as a whole was responsible for the ensuing loss of lives, not just one political party.


Whether Curtin kowtowed too much to MacArthur, or was just making the best of a bad situation, the Australian military was badly used by the US in the SW Pacific.
Did you know that Blamey was the Commander Allied Land Forces in the SWPA until late 1943? True, Mac was forever interfering and Blamey had no operational control over US forces, despite his supposed authority, but I think that any blame should be shared equally. As for why Curtin was kissing Mac's feet- I have a couple of ideas, but they're more rooted in my intense dislike of politicians than in any historical evidence.

Neil,
I'm not disagreeing with the fact that our Commonwealth nations suffered greatly in both world wars. Mistakes and bad leadership abound in all armies.
Too true, mate!


Of course during Gallipoli campaign the ANZAC's lost an incredible amount of men, but so too did the British forces and other Commonwealth nations too.
Few Australians would believe you, should you tell them that both the British and French forces at Gallipoli took more casualties than the ANZACS. Few would believe that the British and French were even there (except the British generals who sent our boys over the top, to their deaths).


However I read an article by a British commander during the later months of the war and he quite simply stated that the BEF of 150,000 men could not cope with the rapid expansion
Was that Plumer's biography? There's some merit in that line of thought, however I think it's too simplistic an answer. Everyone seems to look at the Somme and then compare it to the spectacular German breakthroughs during the Michael Offensives, to show what "properly trained" troops could do on the attack. However, that dismisses the fact that the few times the Germans did go on the operational offensive, they didn't do all that well compared to the Somme. Verdun is perhaps the best example- when comparing meat grinders, Verdun outclasses either the Somme or Ypres.

I think technology, training, surprise (at how the situation developed into static warfare), logistics and too many troops all contributed to what happened between the end of 1914 and the start of 1918. How much each part was of the total is something we will probably never know.

Alastair, I've heard the same myths, mainly from my Irish-Australian grandparents (who hated all things British). Unfortunately it's not 100% correct. Britain did a lot more than is acknowledged, while Australia did a lot less than it could, especially pre-war. For all the fears of the "Yellow Peril", look at the state of our armed forces in 1938- few in the permanent army (the ARA, as we know it today, wasn't formed until 1949), a small, incapable air force and a navy that had real problems getting enough recruits to man all their ships. The cheap solution- relying on reserves/militia, who used equipment drawn from a central pool because there wasn't enough to go around, and keeping equipment levels at the minimum required- was only possible because the RN maintained a presence in the region. Singapore was designed to block any moves south by Japan or China (we know that they got that wrong now, but it was believed before 1942), and we paid nothing towards the garrisoning or upkeep of that vital fortress. In short, we were doing what we still do- relying on a strong ally to protect us, because we were neither strong enough, nor wanted to put an appropriate effort into being strong enough, to defend ourselves. By accepting the protection of the Empire, we made ourselves liable to providing troops when that Empire needed us- hence "Australian Imperial Force" (AIF). When that protection proved illusory, we panicked. Where before 1941 we had trouble raising four divisions for the AIF, in 1944 we had thirteen (though three were "paper" divisions of a brigade or so) and one seventh of our population was in uniform.

Sorry for really long, opinionated post.

Cheers.

Dal.

[csadn]

Coming a bit late to this -- I spent most of today down at an aquarium, and most of last night consoling The SO after our oldest cat died from throat cancer.

Looks as tho' it's been mostly covered -- some exaggeration on the way, but it does give a feeling for how the Aussies were mistreated during the Second. (See "the running rabbits incident" here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokoda_Track_campaign , or the treatment of B/39th Batt.'s survivors following the fight at Kokoda here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/39th_%28Militia%29_Battalion , or the "wartime waterfront conflict" section here: http://www.publicworks.qld.gov.au/sites/qldwwiiplaces/theServices/Pages/MerchantNavy.aspx .)

[Doug]

Dal your point is well taken, and I acept what you are saying, however I was brought up by English parents who also held the same views!:erk: I also had to admit that I am no fan of Blamey either, as I think his leadership was questionable. Yet again this is a personal view based on what I have read.

[Carl_Brisgamer]

(See "the running rabbits incident" here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokoda_Track_campaign , or the treatment of B/39th Batt.'s survivors following the fight at Kokoda here: [url]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/39th_%28Militia%29_Battalion[/url

'The rabbit that runs is the one that gets shot' was Blamey's hamfisted attempt to scold and motivate the troops which had conducted the desperate fighting withdrawal across the Owen Stanleys. Macarthur had been critising the constant 'retreats', and Blamey assumed defeatism had taken hold of the battalions. As in so many cases not only in New Guinea it was an example of the higher echelon headquarters being totally out of touch with the actual conditions at the front. The men of the 39th Battalion as well as the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions were so stung by the slur they took unecessary risks in the subsequent Gona-Buna- Sanananda Campaign and suffered heavy casualties. By the end of the Sanananda Campaign in January 1943 the 39th Battalion could only muster 7 officers and 25 other ranks (To Kokoda and Beyond: The Story of the 39th Battalion 1941-43 p236).

[csadn]

Macarthur had been critising the constant 'retreats',

Pot. Kettle. Black. :P


As in so many cases not only in New Guinea it was an example of the higher echelon headquarters being totally out of touch with the actual conditions at the front. The men of the 39th Battalion as well as the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions were so stung by the slur they took unecessary risks in the subsequent Gona-Buna- Sanananda Campaign and suffered heavy casualties. By the end of the Sanananda Campaign in January 1943 the 39th Battalion could only muster 7 officers and 25 other ranks (To Kokoda and Beyond: The Story of the 39th Battalion 1941-43 p236).

Indeed. And I think it was Sun Tzu who said "if there's problems in the ranks, it is the fault of the leadership". The more I read of this sort of thing, the less thrilled I become with certain aspects of the folks I'm supposed to be rooting for.

[Dal Gavan]

G'day.

Chris, condolences about your cat, mate. Losing a pet is harder than losing some relatives, for me. Sun Tzu is right about leadership leading to "bad" battalions, I think. I've had the misfortune of seeing it happen, a couple of times, during my career in green.

Alastair,
I also had to admit that I am no fan of Blamey either, as I think his leadership was questionable.
Questionable? No question about it, mate, as a leader he was as useful as leaving three pistons out of your Camel's engine. Blamey was ever-willing to put his own interests before those of his troops, or even the mission. It's a disgrace that the square in front of Russell Offices (HQ ADF) is named after him. There's far more deserving men for that honour (Monash, Brudnell-White, Lavarrack, Chauvel or even Albert Jacka, to name a few).

Carl, well said. You may like to read McAuley's Blood and Iron : The Battle for Kokoda 1942 and To The Bitter End: The Buna-Gona Campaign. He doesn't pull any punches and he also uses Japanese sources. His MacARTHUR'S EAGLES: The U.S. Air War over New Guinea, 1943-1944 also got a very good review from the US Naval Institute (http://www.usni.org/store/books/history/macarthurs-eagles). So there's another future addition to my library....

Cheers.

Dal.

[csadn]

Chris, condolences about your cat, mate. Losing a pet is harder than losing some relatives, for me.

[nod] As I've been telling people: Rather than sending me condolences, send a donation to your local feral/stray aid society -- doing that will be *far* more helpful.

(I'm a pragmatist -- something goes wrong, I try to figure out how to fix it. :) )


Sun Tzu is right about leadership leading to "bad" battalions, I think. I've had the misfortune of seeing it happen, a couple of times, during my career in green.

I suppose I'm not the only one to see the Cosmic Irony in that the problem-causer was named "BLAMEy".... :P

"Troops, meet your new Lieutenant -- Gabriel Incompetent-Dolt."
"I think the Universe is running out of Subtlety, mate."

[Carl_Brisgamer]

Carl, well said. You may like to read McAuley's Blood and Iron : The Battle for Kokoda 1942 and To The Bitter End: The Buna-Gona Campaign. He doesn't pull any punches and he also uses Japanese sources. His MacARTHUR'S EAGLES: The U.S. Air War over New Guinea, 1943-1944 also got a very good review from the US Naval Institute (http://www.usni.org/store/books/history/macarthurs-eagles). So there's another future addition to my library....

Thanks Dal, I've read the first two but will have to get 'Macarthur's Eagles' now. I particularly enjoy books that look at the conflict from both sides of the hill.

[Carl_Brisgamer]

Dal your point is well taken, and I acept what you are saying, however I was brought up by English parents who also held the same views!:erk: I also had to admit that I am no fan of Blamey either, as I think his leadership was questionable. Yet again this is a personal view based on what I have read.

Congratulations on your promotion Alastair, crowns on the shoulders now!

I think that makes you the ranking Queensland member :salute:

[Jager]

[nod] As I've been telling people: Rather than sending me condolences, send a donation to your local feral/stray aid society -- doing that will be *far* more helpful.

(I'm a pragmatist -- something goes wrong, I try to figure out how to fix it. :) )


I arrange for the unsellable but safe and usable pet food, litter and toys (dented cans, ripped labels, etc) from my store to go to a local pet shelter; does that count?
Karl

[csadn]

I arrange for the unsellable but safe and usable pet food, litter and toys (dented cans, ripped labels, etc) from my store to go to a local pet shelter; does that count?
Karl

Oh, definitely.

[Lt. S.Kafloc]

Gallipoli casualties (not including illness)
-------------------Dead Wounded Missing Prisoners Total
Ottoman Empire---56,643-----107,007----11,178--------------174,828
United Kingdom----34,072-----78,520------7,654--------------119,696
France-------------9,798-----17,371---------------------------27,169
Australia------------8,709----19,441----------------------------28,150
New Zealand--------2,721-----4,752-----------------------------7,473
British India ---------1,358----3,421------------------------------4,779
Newfoundland----------49--------93--------------------------------142
Total Allies----------56,707--123,598----------------------------187,409

Casualty figures for the campaign vary between sources, but it is believed that by the time the Gallipoli Campaign ended over 100,000 men had died, including 56,000 – 68,000 Turkish and around 53,000 British and French soldiers. Carlyon gives 43,000 British killed or missing, including 8,709 Australians. Among the dead were 2,721 New Zealanders, about a quarter of those who had landed on the peninsula. In total there were nearly half a million casualties during the campaign, with the British Official History listing total losses, including sick, as 205,000 British, 47,000 French and 251,000 Turkish. Yet Turkish casualties have been disputed and were likely higher, with another source listing 2,160 officers and 287,000 other ranks. Included among this may be as many as 87,000 killed. Many soldiers became sick due to the unsanitary conditions, especially from enteric fever, dysentery and diarrhoea. It is estimated that 145,000 more British soldiers became ill during the campaign.