75th anniversary of the Fall of Singapore 15 February 1942

[Carl_Brisgamer]

February 15, 2017 makes the 75th anniversary of the fall of Singapore. Winston Churchill described the defeat as the worst disaster in British military history. About 80,000 British, Indian and Australian troops became prisoners of war, joining 50,000 taken by the Japanese in the earlier Malayan Campaign. These prisoners suffered great deprivations at places like Changi Prison and building the Thai-Burma Railway. Used as slave labour, 12,621 Allied POWs died during the construction of the railway including 6,904 British, 2,802 Australian, 2,782 Dutch, and 133 American. More died on the 'hellships' that transported POWs to the Japanese home islands later in the war.

Let us pause to remember those who fought, those who fell and those survived, many of whom where profoundly damaged physically and mentally by their ordeal.

For an authoritative but concise account of the Malayan Campaign see https://www.awm.gov.au/talks-speeche...-of-singapore/

[Jager]

For the brave:
Karl

[Baxter]

I visited the Battlebox HQ a couple of weeks back where the surrender decision was made. Australian General Gordon Bennett managed to escape after that meeting too.

[Stumptonian]

Let us pause to remember those who fought, those who fell and those survived, many of whom where profoundly damaged physically and mentally by their ordeal.

Indeed.

[gully_raker]

My adopted brother Geoff (18 years older!) was captured in Singapore & remained in Changi until released.
My Godfather's son Arthur Quinn was also captured & sadly died on the Burma Railway.

I visited Changi some years ago to honour both of them & also visited Sentosa Island.
It was a moving experience for me.

& to all who died during their captivity. R.I.P.

[Doug]

One of Churchill's biggest stuff up as for Percivile what an idiot.

[Marechallannes]

Singapore & the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales & HMS Repules before were two bitter defeats for the British Empire in 1941.

Many brave men lost their lives there.

[Naharaht]

For all those who suffered and died because of those tragedies.

[BobP]

Thanks for posting this reminder of this and that we should remember what they went through.

[Flying Helmut]

For all those who suffered and died because of those tragedies.

Well said!

[Setarius]

[csadn]

Someday, I need to write up the alt-hist where the ABDA countries realize "you can't defend this area with the ships you have; you'd best figure out how to defend it with no ships at all"; and the Japanese find themselves staring down the barrel of a bucketload of torpedo-armed flying boats and landplanes....

[Carl_Brisgamer]

For anyone interested click on the link below to access some podcasts about the experiences of Allued prisoners of war taken by the Japanese. The stories are moving, inspiring and horrifying.

http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/.../?query=Changi

[Jager]

Someday, I need to write up the alt-hist where the ABDA countries realize "you can't defend this area with the ships you have; you'd best figure out how to defend it with no ships at all"; and the Japanese find themselves staring down the barrel of a bucketload of torpedo-armed flying boats and landplanes....

That would have required them to have the planes. As I recall, the Brits were rather busy somewhere else, and Australia wasn't a big aircraft producer then.
Karl

[csadn]

That would have required them to have the planes. As I recall, the Brits were rather busy somewhere else, and Australia wasn't a big aircraft producer then.

Airplanes could be had -- the problem was: Most of the budget had been sunk [ahem] into capital ships which were too big and expensive to risk anywhere near an airforce (can you say "_Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_"?).

The Dutch had a brace of (believe it or not) Dornier Do-24s; and units such as the PBY Catalina, or Hudson, were available. Fighters were a little harder to come by [understatement of the millennium], but most IJ bombers flew unescorted anyway....

[BobP]

Looking at my AIRFILE book and I see the British and Dutch had a number of fighters, Buffalos and Hurricanes but didn't use them the right way.

[Carl_Brisgamer]

The Japanese threat was underestimated by the Allies in SEA. In early 1941 the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies received a briefing from the Imperial Chiefs of Staff in London where he was told that although Malaya would not receive the promised number of aircraft "the majority of the 450 shore based aircraft which the Japanese can muster against us are of obsolete types and ..... we have no reason to believe that Japanese standards are even comparable with those of the Italians." They also informed the Australian PM that the Brewster Buffalo fighter being sent to Malaya was an "eminently satisfactory" type that would "probably prove more than a match for Japanese aircraft." Reports from China about the Oscar and the Zero seem to have been disregarded. And of course there were the SNAFU's such as the delivery of a half dozen very useful Bristol Beaufort torpedo bombers to Singapore in December 1941, only for the unit to be sent back to Australia because the aircraft had not been fitted with armament (Johnston, Whispering Death - Australian Airmen of the Pacific War).

In actual fact the number of Japanese Navy and Army aircraft ranged against south east Asia in December 1941 numbered some 4600. At the fateful hour the Commonwealth Air Forces in Malaya could muster barely 150 front line aircraft.

The lack of trained aircrew were a massive problem, particularly in the fighter squadrons. While some units were well trained although not tested in combat (the Australian Hudson squadrons No's 1 and 8 received good reports), others had been hastily formed and given little operation training. Between January and December 1941 Far East Command reported 67 air accidents which killed 48 aircrew with inexperience being judged the main cause (Johnston again).

This is not to say that Britain, like the US in the Philippines, could not have done much better. Britain sent 600 first line combat aircraft to Russia in the second half of 1941, imagine if even half of those had been sent to Singapore? Aircrew were being churned out of the EATS across the Commonwealth at a phenomenal rate, but they were all being sent to the UK and North Africa to fight current battles.

Any alternate history that reinforces Singapore, the Philippines and Java would need to take into account those resources not being available to the RAF Bomber Command's night bombing campaign, the battles in the Western Desert and the war in Russia. Butterfly effect.

[csadn]

The Japanese threat was underestimated by the Allies in SEA.[...] Reports from China about the Oscar and the Zero seem to have been disregarded.

In a nutshell. And there were warnings even before the War -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamikaze_(1937_aircraft) alone should have been a Big Red Flag that Japan was *not* as backwards as was commonly believed. (Part of the backstory for my alt is "some people actually paid attention, and "built around" the Hidebound Traditionalists causing the problems.)

Any alternate history that reinforces Singapore, the Philippines and Java would need to take into account those resources not being available to the RAF Bomber Command's night bombing campaign, the battles in the Western Desert and the war in Russia. Butterfly effect.

Actually, Singapore is *not* getting reinforced -- and neither is anyplace else the Japanese can "walk to" (that is: Any place which is well inside the reach of escorted bombers, or a fleet with BBs and CAs). Really, there's no defensible point forward of about where the historical battle-line existed (Papua New Guinea/Australia), because the only nation with a viable battle fleet in the area is Japan. Thus, the strategy for the defense is "destroy the fleet", to include transports as well as combat units; that done, the ground troops can be left to "rot on the vine" (as George Kenney put it). Thus, the extensive use of aircraft, armed with torpedoes (viability light to variable) and bombs (somewhat more reliable), until one's own battle fleet(s) can show up. The campaign will still be defensive; but it will not feature the (unnecessary) loss of troops and ships as happened historically.

[Carl_Brisgamer]

Actually, Singapore is *not* getting reinforced -- and neither is anyplace else the Japanese can "walk to" (that is: Any place which is well inside the reach of escorted bombers, or a fleet with BBs and CAs). Really, there's no defensible point forward of about where the historical battle-line existed (Papua New Guinea/Australia), because the only nation with a viable battle fleet in the area is Japan. Thus, the strategy for the defense is "destroy the fleet", to include transports as well as combat units; that done, the ground troops can be left to "rot on the vine" (as George Kenney put it). Thus, the extensive use of aircraft, armed with torpedoes (viability light to variable) and bombs (somewhat more reliable), until one's own battle fleet(s) can show up. The campaign will still be defensive; but it will not feature the (unnecessary) loss of troops and ships as happened historically.

Hardly alternate history Chris, the Japanese were stopped in New Guinea and Guadalcanal predominantly by the effective use of airpower - the Battle of the Bismarck Sea being the classic example.

My point was that in late 1941-early 1942 the aircraft, crews and weapons to arm them just were not available in SEA because of the demands of the European war, even though the US was not 'officially' involved at the time. Alt history would start with the British and US taking the Japanese threat seriously and diverting resources in mid 1941. But as I said that would have impacted the war effort elsewhere. 200+ less Hurricanes, Blenheims and P-40s for the Western Desert, not to mention fuel and ammunition, may have had catastrophic consequences for the Commonwealth forces who were hanging on to Egypt by their fingernails. The result could have seen Rommel's Afrika Korps astride the Suez Canal and the Generalfeldmarschall himself dining in Cairo by early 1942.

[csadn]

Hardly alternate history Chris, the Japanese were stopped in New Guinea and Guadalcanal predominantly by the effective use of airpower - the Battle of the Bismarck Sea being the classic example.

True -- which just goes to show the thoroughgoing idiocy of the plans to defend Singapore. Better to let them in, then cut them off and let them rot.

The difference is: It happens in late-'41/early-'42, rather than late-'43. Like the old joke about putting barbed-wire on the bannister: It won't stop him, but it'll sure slow him down....

My point was that in late 1941-early 1942 the aircraft, crews and weapons to arm them just were not available in SEA because of the demands of the European war, even though the US was not 'officially' involved at the time. Alt history would start with the British and US taking the Japanese threat seriously and diverting resources in mid 1941. But as I said that would have impacted the war effort elsewhere. 200+ less Hurricanes, Blenheims and P-40s for the Western Desert, not to mention fuel and ammunition, may have had catastrophic consequences for the Commonwealth forces who were hanging on to Egypt by their fingernails. The result could have seen Rommel's Afrika Korps astride the Suez Canal and the Generalfeldmarschall himself dining in Cairo by early 1942.

I don't see Hurricanes bring sent. The experience of Australia with another inline-powered fighter, the P-40, tells us "inline engines in PTO are a Bad Idea" (for that matter: The general experience of inlines in PTO is Bad; even the vaunted P-38 had problems). What I'm picturing is something I've mentioned elsewhere: Instead of giving the Aussies P-40s, hand them "the French order" -- 75 or so F4Fs (de-navalized, but still better-suited for overwater ops), plus the Martin 167 "Maryland"s and Douglas DB-7s for short- and -medium-range attack and patrol work (plus the historically-delivered Hudsons for long-range ops), in '40; with the experience gained from those, further stocks can be shipped to Australia directly. (Crews wouldn't be a problem; the Empire Air Training Scheme was up and running in '40.) And since Britain used a very small number of F4Fs itself, by standardizing Australia on the acft. mentioned, one does not have the problem of multiple elements of the Empire squabbling over limited British production capability -- for that matter: Australia could acquire the acft. needed direct from the US.

This also alleviates the other concern: The relative handful of F4Fs, M-167s, and such subtracted from North Africa is balanced by the influx of units which, in reality, were shipped to other fronts. (The maintenance crews would thank me -- they don't have to deal with quite so many different spare parts suppliers. :) ) And since a large part of the question of Threat Response is "can we risk robbing Peter to pay Paul", if the Aussies can be hooked up with units which Britain doesn't necessarily "need", it makes the decision to send them in the first place that much easier.

[Marechallannes]

True -- which just goes to show the thoroughgoing idiocy of the plans to defend Singapore. Better to let them in, then cut them off and let them rot.

Sometimes you need to hold a point at any cost.

Singapore was "the" UK military base in the south-east Asia region, mainly in line with Royal Navy needs.


Beside the fact that nobody would let take the Japanese this places without resistance - to cut them off you need ships, planes, troops, too.

Something there was a real lack of there for UK armed forces in 1941.

[Dan-Sam]

I'm surprised about your personal experience with such far battle. For me, Singapor was "another world, until we had clients from there on December '16. I must study at least basics about this part.

[Jager]

Instead of giving the Aussies P-40s, hand them "the French order" -- 75 or so F4Fs (de-navalized, but still better-suited for overwater ops), plus the Martin 167 "Maryland"s and Douglas DB-7s for short- and -medium-range attack and patrol work (plus the historically-delivered Hudsons for long-range ops), in '40; with the experience gained from those, further stocks can be shipped to Australia directly. (Crews wouldn't be a problem; the Empire Air Training Scheme was up and running in '40.) And since Britain used a very small number of F4Fs itself, by standardizing Australia on the acft. mentioned, one does not have the problem of multiple elements of the Empire squabbling over limited British production capability -- for that matter: Australia could acquire the acft. needed direct from the US.

This also alleviates the other concern: The relative handful of F4Fs, M-167s, and such subtracted from North Africa is balanced by the influx of units which, in reality, were shipped to other fronts. (The maintenance crews would thank me -- they don't have to deal with quite so many different spare parts suppliers. ) And since a large part of the question of Threat Response is "can we risk robbing Peter to pay Paul", if the Aussies can be hooked up with units which Britain doesn't necessarily "need", it makes the decision to send them in the first place that much easier.

Interesting thoughts; the biggest flaw is that Japan wasn't thought to be a threat in 1940. Sure, the USN expected a war with them sometime, but is wasn't until mid '41 (occupation of southern French Indochina) that it was clear that the Japanese might go attack Western bases/colonies in the SW pacific region. So it wouldn't be clear until then why you would send warplanes needed in the active war fronts. By the time of the oil embargo (which was to curb Japanese behavior, forgetting the total lack of understanding of the Japanese mindset and viewpoints), it would have been rather late to setup enough squadrons to matter.
Personally, I love to conceive some alt-history game/fiction with a not-at-war USA supplying a AVG to Australia for use against the Japanese aggression; the kill-factor is that without the USN, the IJN would trash pretty much anything else in the neighborhood.
Karl

[Marechallannes]

... the kill-factor is that without the USN, the IJN would trash pretty much anything else in the neighborhood.

That's pretty true.

[csadn]

Interesting thoughts; the biggest flaw is that Japan wasn't thought to be a threat in 1940.

Not strictly correct -- the problem (as ever) was that the people running the Western militaries were the worst kind of Hidebound Traditionalist Peacetime Officers; the folks who'd actually gotten out of the office and looked knew full-well what kind of danger Japan was, but since they weren't in positions to accomplish much (officially, anyway -- more on this later), nothing got done.

Sure, the USN expected a war with them sometime, but is wasn't until mid '41 (occupation of southern French Indochina) that it was clear that the Japanese might go attack Western bases/colonies in the SW pacific region. So it wouldn't be clear until then why you would send warplanes needed in the active war fronts. By the time of the oil embargo (which was to curb Japanese behavior, forgetting the total lack of understanding of the Japanese mindset and viewpoints), it would have been rather late to setup enough squadrons to matter.

As noted above: The people who knew the Real Game were the younger, lower-ranked officers; above them were a mass of geriatric incompetent fools (the sort who say things like "the dratted things didn't exist when *I* was a midshipman; I don't see why they should exist *now*!"). That said: There were folks who were trying to do *something* to alleviate the problem (the "Empire Air Training Scheme" wasn't *strictly* for Britain's benefit... >:) ); some officers with the "Miscreant E4" line of thinking could have accomplished much -- for ex., here's the rough timeline, with insights into the thinking of various folks involved:

June '40: France is overrun, Britain takes up the French orders of F4Fs (G-36s), DB-7s, Baltimores, and so on.

August-December '40: Britain is deciding how best to apportion the acft. it's acquiring. Britain offers the Australians P-40s. Knowing all-too-well why the local bush pilots *don't* fly inline-powered acft. if they can avoid it, Australia says, "Um, those are nice, but we'd really prefer radial-powered acft. -- they're much simpler to deal with; they work better in areas with high heat, and high humidity; and if something happens closer to home, well, radials are a lot better suited for over-water ops -- you don't see many inline-powered naval acft., do you?" Britain says, "All right, that's a cogent argument; here, have the F4Fs, DB-7s, and Baltimores from the French order, plus some Hudsons for long-range recon -- they're also radials." The Aussies then spend the next few months working up on the acft., so the RAAF looks a bit like this:

-- Fighter Squadrons: F4Fs, non-Navalized [French at first; then special-orders]
-- Ground-Attack Squadrons: Some DB-7 [A-20 _Havoc_s]; some Martin 167 _Baltimore_ [the four wing-mount 0.30s are a big help here]
-- Maritime Recon Squadrons: Mostly _Hudson_s, plus a few _Baltimore_s with extra tanks in the bomb bay.

[Meanwhile the P-40s and such which historically would have gone to Oz are instead used by the RAF in North Africa.]

Early '41: Some RAAF units are cycled back home; "war-weary" units as described above are shipped to Australia for training purposes; some newer units are acquired for training as well.

Mid-'41: Japan occupies Indochina. As soon as the Aussie gov't finishes s***ting enough bricks to build villages for all the Aboriginals, they put out a call to the Americans requesting/demanding/begging for every F4F, DB-7, 167, and _Hudson_ they can get. The Aussies then receive a surprise call from the Dutch East Indies, to the tune of "Listen -- the Japanese have BBs and CAs; the biggest ship any of us have is a destroyer-leader; we can't defend this area with the ships we have, so we need to figure out how to defend it with no ships at all; you mind if we join you?" More acft. are sent, this time to the Dutch (who, for obvious reasons, can't get any more of the Dornier Do-24s which make up most of their air power; they get a bunch of PBY _Catalina_s for "tripwire" work -- when the Cats stop reporting, ABDA knows where the CVs are fighters are... :P ). What ships are present are also on "tripwire" detail -- see the Japanese, report in, and *RUN*.

Late '41: Much time is spent flying patrol missions, learning OJT to spot and ID ships. More acft. arrive weekly, so a proper rota can be set up.

Dec. '41-early '42: The IJN finally shows up; while they have the only "proper" battlefleet in the area, they learn that ABDA has *no* intention of engaging it head-on. Instead, they are faced with "cattle raids" on the transport fleets -- a _Hudson_ or two spots them; a force of _Maryland_s appears, strafes the hell out of the transports, possibly crippling or sinking one or two with each attack (and the Japanese *can't* replace these any better than they can replace combat-unit losses...); if fighters show up, they get surprised by the F4Fs. (_Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ are never sent, as they don't really need to be; the strategy specifically calls for *not* sending penny-packets of capital ships against an IJN battle fleet!)

The Japanese do eventually occupy the territory they occupied historically -- but it is a lot more costly for them, and a lot less costly for the ABDA forces, who are able to decamp for Oz with most of their acft. (Singapore is screwed, as noted upthread; but instead of holding it while awaiting rescue which will never come, it receives a token defense, while the focus of the exercise involves air strikes on shipping in the area.)

Personally, I love to conceive some alt-history game/fiction with a not-at-war USA supplying a AVG to Australia for use against the Japanese aggression; the kill-factor is that without the USN, the IJN would trash pretty much anything else in the neighborhood.
Karl

See above -- the entire plan is based on the fact that only Japan has a battlefleet in the area, and any attempt to contest it head-on is going to result in a futile and stupid slaughter of those attacking it. On that basis, the only reasonable strategy is to "fight around" that battlefleet, like 5th AF ended up doing in reality -- "hit where they *ain't*"....